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NOTES
THE WARSAW CONVENTION-DOES IT CREATE A
CAUSE OF ACTION?
INTRODUCTION

For twenty-one years, Judge Lumbard's opinion for a unanimous court in
Noel v. Linea Aeropostal Venezolana' stood for the proposition that the
Warsaw Convention 2 did not create a cause of action for wrongful death or
personal injury. 3 Recently, however, with Judge Lumbard's majority opinion
in Benjamins v. British European Airways, 4 the Second Circuit completely
discarded this precedent.
Prior to Benjamins, federal courts entertained litigation involving the
Warsaw Convention only if the parties satisfied the requirements of diversity
jurisdiction. 5 The effect of Benjamins, however, is that any action involving
"international transportation '6 over which the United States has "treaty"
1. 247 F.2d 677 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 907 (1957).
2. Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation
by Air, October 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, T.S. No. 876, 137 L.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter cited as
Warsaw Convention]. Although the United States was not a party to the Warsaw Conference, the
Department of State sent observers to the proceedings. On April 17, 1934, President Roosevelt
transmitted the Warsaw Convention to the Senate requesting its advice and consent to
adherence by the United States. Message from the President of the United States Transmitting a
Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules, S. Exec. Doc. No. G, 73d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1934), reprinted in 1,934 U.S. Av. 239. The United States Senate gave its advice and consent to
the Convention on June 15, 1934 and it became the law of this country. The President, with the
advice and consent of the Senate, has the power to make treaties for the United States. U.S.
Const. art. II, § 2. All treaties made by the United States are, in conjunction with the
Constitution and the laws of the United States, the supreme law of the land. Id. art. VI. The lack
of supplementary or enabling action by the Senate in adhering to the Convention prompted one
commentator to state that "there is no evidence that, by advising adherence, the Senate had any
intention of circumscribing the jurisdiction of the Federal courts." Robbins, Jurisdiction Under
Article 28 of the Warsaw Convention, 9 McGill L.J. 352, 355 (1963), reprinted in Hague Protocol
to Warsaw Convention: Hearingson Executive H Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations,
89th Cong., lst, Sess. 85, 87 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Hague Hearings].
3. Accord, Evangelinos v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 550 F.2d 152, 154 n.7 (3d Cir. 1977);
Maugnie v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 549 F.2d 1256, 1258 n.2 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
431 U.S. 974 (1977); Martinez Hernandez v. Air France, 545 F.2d 279, 281 n.1 (1st Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 430 U.S. 950 (1977); Husserl v. Swiss Air Transport Co., 388 F. Supp. 1238,
1243-47 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Zousmer v. Canadian Pacific Air Lines, Ltd., 307 F. Supp. 892, 899
(S.D.N.Y. 1969); Notarian v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 874, 877 (W.D. Pa.
1965); Winsor v. United Air Lines, Inc., 159 F. Supp. S56, 857-58 (D. Del. 1958); Fernandez v.
Aeropostal Venezolana, 156 F. Supp. 94, 98 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); Rosman v. Trans World Airlines,
Inc., 34 N.Y.2d 385, 398, 314 N.E.2d 848, 856, 358 N.Y.S.2d 97, 108 (1974); Sheris v. Sheris
Co., 212 Va. 825, 828, 188 S.E.2d 367, 370, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 878 (1972).
4. 572 F.2d 913 (2d Cir. 1978), petitionfor cert. filed, 47 U.S.L.W. 3070 (U.S. July 24, 1978)
(No. 78-129).
5. See, e.g., Husserl v. Swiss Air Transport Co., 383 F. Supp. 1238, 1241 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
6. International transportation is defined in the Convention by article 1: "(1) This convention
shall apply to all international transportation of persons, baggage, or goods performed by aircraft
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jurisdiction 7 now satisfies federal question jurisdiction. 8 In Benjamins, the
district court was found to have subject matter jurisdiction over an action
brought by a Dutch citizen who resided in California against a British airline
and a British aircraft manufacturer for the wrongful death of his wife, also a
Dutch citizen, resulting from an accident that occurred in England. Mrs.
Benjamins was one of 112 passengers aboard an aircraft, owned and operated
by British European Airways, 9 that crashed on June 18, 1972 shortly after

takeoff from London on a flight to Brussels. All the passengers and crew were
killed in the accident, and, subsequently, claims were brought by relatives of
the deceased in England, Belgium, and the United States."°
for hire. It shall apply equally to gratuitous transportation by aircraft performed by an air
transportation enterprise.
"(2) For the purposes of this convention the expression 'international transportation' shall mean
any transportation in which, according to the contract made by the parties, the place of departure
and the place of destination, whether or not there be a break in the transportation or a
transshipment, are situated either within the territories of two High Contracting Parties, or within
the territory of a single High Contracting Party, if there is an agreed stopping place within a
territory subject to the sovereignty, suzerainty, mandate or authority of another power, even
though that power is not a party to this convention. Transportation without such an agreed
stopping place between territories subject to the sovereignty, suzerainty, mandate, or authority of
the same High Contracting Party shall not be deemed to be international for the purposes of this
convention.
"(3) Transportation to be performed by several successive air carriers shall be deemed, for the
purposes of this convention, to be one undivided transportation, if it has been regarded by the
parties as a single operation, whether it has been agreed upon under the form of a single contract
or of a series of contracts, and it shall not lose its international character merely because one
contract or a series of contracts is to be performed entirely within a territory subject to the
sovereignty, suzerainty, mandate, or authority of the same High Contracting Party." Warsaw
Convention, supra note 2, art. 1.
7. Article 28 of the Convention provides for jurisdiction in the "treaty sense" in that it
expressly limits the number of jurisdictions in which the plaintiff may sue. Article
28(1) provides: "An action for damages must be brought, at the option of the plaintiff, in the
territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, either before the court of the domicile of the
carrier or of his principal place of business, or where he has a place of business through which the
contract has been made, or before the court at the place of destination." Warsaw Convention.
supra note 2, art. 28(1).
8. Under Benjamins, the amount in controversy must still exceed $10,000 in order for a case
to satisfy federal question jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. §1331(a) (1976) provides: "The district courts
shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions wherein the matter in controversy exceeds the
sum or value of $10,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and arises under the Constitution, laws,
or treaties of the United States."
9. British European Airways (BEA) never flew to or from the United States. The aircraft
involved in the accident was a Trident, manufactured by Hawker Siddeley Aviation, Ltd. (HSA).
Both BEA and HSA are British corporations with their principal places of business in the United
Kingdom. Benjamins v. British European Airways, 572 F.2d at 914. No airline in the United
States owns or operates any Trident aircraft, nor does any foreign airline operate Trident aircraft
to or from any point in the United States.
10. Although several Americans were on board the flight, the majority of the passengers were
British and Belgian. Of the 17 wrongful death actions brought in this country, two were filed in
state court. See Clarizio v. British European Airways Corp., No. 73 L 5997 (Cir. Ct. Ill., filed
1973); Rauworth v. British European Airways Corp., No. 72 L 14039 (Cir. Ct. Ill., filed 1972).
The other 15, including Benjamins, were consolidated pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1976),
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Under Article 28 of the Convention, "treaty" jurisdiction was available to
the Benjamins estate in any court of the United States because Mrs. Benjamins had purchased her ticket in Los Angeles, and because that was the
ultimate destination of her journey.' In the federal court, however, there
must also be "domestic" subject matter jurisdiction-usually diversity or
federal question jurisdiction-in order to maintain the action.' 2 The Benjarains opinion is a search for a source of "domestic" jurisdiction.
This Note will contend that the Warsaw Convention does not create an
independent cause of action. After surveying the basic history and principles
of the Convention and the status of the law in the United States prior to
Benjarnins, it will criticize the reasoning of the court's opinion. The analysis
will include an examination of the legal considerations relevant to the creation
of a cause of action addressed during the drafting, adoption, and revision of
the Convention and a discussion of the possible ramifications of the court's
decision.
I. THE WARSAW CONVENTION
The purpose of the Warsaw Convention was to ensure uniform application
of certain rules relating to international air transportation. The need to
establish such uniform rules resulted in the First International Conference on
Private Aeronautical Law at Paris in 1925. The delegates at Paris established
the Comit6 International Techniche d'Experts Juridique Ariens (CITEJA), a
committee assigned the task of drafting international agreements relating to
all aspects of international air law.14 In 1929, CITEJA presented to the
and assigned to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York for
coordinated pretrial and discovery proceedings. In Re Air Crash Disaster at Staines, England,
June 18, 1972, No. 147 (J.P.M.D.L. Oct. 26, 1073) (order of consolidation). All the
American cases, except Benjarnins, were settled out of court.
11. The United States, therefore, satisfies the last two options set forth in article 28. See note
7 supra and accompanying text. The United Kingdom, the domicile and principal place of
business of BEA, would satisfy either of the first two options.
12. Benjamins v. British European Airways, 572 F.2d at 915; see Smith v. Canadian Pacific
Airways, Ltd., 452 F.2d 798 (2d Cir. 1971).
13. The Benjamins action was commenced in the United States District Court for the Central
District of California with subject matter jurisdiction allegedly based on diversity of citizenship.
Benjamins v. British European Airways, No. 73-381 (C.D. Cal., filed Feb. 21, 1973). The same
case was later filed in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York
where both British defendants conceded to the in personam jurisdiction of the court. 572 F.2d at
915 n.4. The district court first dismissed the case for lack of diversity jurisdiction and
subsequently dismissed plaintiff's amended complaint based on federal question jurisdiction, Id.
at 915. Simultaneously with his appeal to the Second Circuit, Mr. Benjamins filed a wrongful
death action in a New York state court. That action has been dismissed on the grounds of forum
non conveniens. Benjamins v. British European Airways, No. 15138/77 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. May 5,
1978). Since the decedent and the plaintiff were both resident in California, that state was
probably the most convenient venue available to Mr. Benjamins in the United States.
14. CITEJA and its successor, the Legal Committee of the International Civil Aviation
Organization (ICAO), have been responsible for several draft conventions in addition to the
Warsaw Convention. The most important of these treaties is the Chicago Convention, Convention on International Civil Aviation, Dec. 7, 1944, 61 Stat. 1180, T.I.A.S. 1591, 15 U.N.T.S.
295, which governs nearly all of the technical aspects of international civil aviation. The Rome
Convention of 1952, Convention on Damage Caused by Foreign Aircraft to Third Parties on the
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delegates a draft relating to the rights and liabilities of air carriers,
passengers, and consignors and consignees of goods. After eight days of debate
the draft took its final form as the Warsaw Convention.'6
The Convention has since been revised by the Hague Protocol in 1955,1
the Guadalajara Convention in 1961, 7 the Guatemala Protocol in 1971,18 and,
most recently, the four Additional Montreal Protocols in 1975.1 9 Their
practical effect on the Warsaw Convention has been to create a web of
approximately fourteen liability schemes. 20 Application of a particular scheme
to any one passenger is governed by the itinerary specified in the passenger
ticket rather than by the route of the flight in question. 2' Consequently,
depending on their individual contracts of carriage, the rights of passengers
aboard the same flight may be governed according to different schemes of
liability. 22 Nevertheless, no matter which scheme of Convention-related
Surface, Oct. 7, 1952, 310 U.N.T.S. 181, governs the liabilities of the carrier to third parties for
damages to property on the ground. The United States did not sign or adhere to the Rome
Convention.
15. A list of those nations present at the Warsaw Conference can be found in the preamble to
the Convention. For a list of the 93 current adherents to the Convention, see Civil Aeronautics
Board, Aeronautical Statutes and Related Material 509 (1978).
16. Protocol to Amend the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to
International Carriage by Air Signed at Warsaw on 12 October 1929. September 28, 1955, 478
U.N.T.S. 371 [hereinafter cited as Hague Protocol], reprinted iz 11 International Conference on
Private Air Law, The Hague, September 1955, at 1-13, ICAO Doc. 7686-LCJ140 (1956)
[hereinafter cited as Hague Documents]. The Hague Protocol has been adhered to by considerably
fewer nations than the Convention, and, therefore, will apply in fewer cases. Although most of
Europe has ratified this Protocol, the United States has not.
17. Convention, Supplementary to the Warsaw Convention, for the Unification of Certain
Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air Performed by a Person Other Than the
Contracting Carrier, September 1961. 500 U.N.T.S. 31. This Convention was adopted to govern
international air charter transportation; it has never been adhered to by the United States18. Protocol to Amend the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to
International Carriage by Air Signed at Warsaw on 12 October 1929 as Amended by the Protocol
Done at The Hague on 28 September 1955, March 8, 1971, ICAO Doc. 8932 (1971) [hereinafter
cited as Guatemala Protocol], reprinted in Il International Conference on Air Law, Guatemala
City, ICAO Doc. 9040-LC/167-2 at 189-93 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Guatemala Documents]. This
Protocol, although signed by the United States, see Civil Aeronautics Board, Aeronautical
Statutes and Related Materials 539 (1978), will not come into effect until signed by 30 nations,
Guatemala Protocol, supra, art. XX.
19. Additional Protocols Nos. 1-4, ICAO Does. 9145-9148 (1975). These protocols have not
been adhered to by the United States. They amend the previous protocols by specifying the
damage limitations in terms of Special Drawing Rights created by the International Monetary
Fund rather than in terms of gold. See generally Fitzgerald, The Four Montreal Protocols to
Amend the Warsaw Convention Regime Governing InternationalCarriage By Air, 42 J. Air L_ &
Com. 273 (1976).
20. See generally C. Shawcross & K. Beaumont, Air Law, 341-81 (4th ed. P Martin, J
McClean, E. Martin, J. Bristow & J. Brooks 1977) [hereinafter cited as C. Shawcross & K
Beaumont].
21. Factors such as the domicile of the passenger or the airline, the origin or destination of the
particular flight from which the claim arose, or, in the case of an accident, the place where such
accident occurred, are irrelevant to the determination of which scheme is to apply to any one case.
22. See Tompkins, Limitation of Liability by Treaty and Statute, 36 J. Air L. & Com. 421,
424-26 (1970). See also Kennelly, Problens Regarding Aviation Litigation, 20 De Paul L. Rev.
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liability applies to an action for the wrongful death or personal injury of a
passenger, a basic compromise is always present-the carrier is presumed
23
liable on the happening of an accident,
but its liability is limited to an
24
amount prescribed by the treaty.
Because they anticipated universal adherence to the Convention, the delegates at Warsaw in 1929 had to establish a set of liability rules that were
compatible with a diverse group of national legal systems. 2 5 Although the
delegates were able to unify "certain rules" and allocate certain burdens
imposed by questions of conflicts of laws, 26 they were unable to provide for
several substantive and procedural questions.
Contrary to the contentions of the Benjamins majority, a review of the
historical materials available 27 indicates that rather than create a new and
independent cause of action, the drafters of the Warsaw Convention intended
to establish certain rules to: (1) unify procedures in international air transportation regarding ticketing and air cargo documentation; 28 (2) create a presumption of liability in favor of passengers in case of accidents; 29 (3) limit the
number of fora in which an action can be brought; 30 and (4) limit the liability
of the carrier with respect to each passenger 3 I in order to protect the young
436 (1971). The protocols to the Warsaw Convention .-ere meant to be progressive, and it was
hoped that each would supercede the existent versions of the treaty. The scope of the application
of a treaty, however, depends upon the number of nations that ratify or adhere to it.
23. Warsaw Convention, supra note 2, art. 17.
24. Id. art. 22. Whenever the contract of carriage between the passenger and the carrier
includes an agreed stopping place in the territory of the United States, the Agreement Relating to
Liability Limitations of the Warsaw Convention and the Hague Protocol, CAB Agreement No.
18900, approved by CAB Order No. E-23680, May 13, 1966, CAB Docket 17325, 31 Fed. Reg.
7302 (1966) [hereinafter cited as the Montreal Agreement], increases the liability of the carrier to
$75,000. The Montreal Agreement, although not a treaty, is an agreement by over 100 carriers to
include provisions in their conditions of carriage that increase their maximum liability limitation
and waive their ability under article 20 of the Convention to escape liability by proving that they
took all necessary measures to avoid the accident. The Montreal Agreement resulted from tile
denunciation of the Convention by the United States, which was to take effect only one day after
the Agreement was signed. As a result of the Agreement, however, the United States withdrew Its
denunciation. See Note, Warsaw Convention-Air Cirrier Liability for Passenger Injuries
Sustained Within a Terminal, 45 Fordham L. Rev. 369. 372-74 (1976). See generally Lowenfeld
& Mendelsohn, The United States and the Warsaw Convention, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 497 (1967).
25. Without the presence of a delegation from the United States, however, the delegates could
not have been expected to address the possible ramifications of the Convention in a nation
consisting of the general jurisdictions of 48 states, each having its own body of substantive law,
as well as the limited jurisdiction of the federal courts. See generally G. Miller, Liability In
International Air Transport 228 (1977).
26. See C. Shawcross & K. Beaumont, supra note 20, at 339.
27. In interpreting the Convention, the following factors should be considered: the text of tile
Convention, the intent of the delegates as expressed in the minutes, and the subsequent
interpretation by international committees, conferences responsible for updating the Convention, and nations that are parties to the Convention. See. e.g., Reed v. Wiser, 555 F.2d 1079 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 922 (1977); Block v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 386 F.2d 323
(5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 905 (1968).
28. Warsaw Convention, supra note 2, arts. 3-16.
29. Id. art. 17.
30. Id. art. 28.
31. Id. art. 22.
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and vulnerable airline industry from damage awards which might drain its
economic resources. 32 Prior to Benjamins, the United States courts had
approached questions of the substantive effect of the Warsaw Convention in a
similar fashion.
I.

CAUSES OF ACTION PRIOR TO BE JIAMINS

The first case in the United States to address the issue of whether the
Convention
created a cause of action was Choy v. Pan-American Airways
Co. 33 In Choy, the court disallowed a wrongful death claim founded upon the
Warsaw Convention, holding that the treaty could not be enforced in this
country without an enabling act creating a cause of action or naming those
who could sue for a passenger's death. 34 This reasoning was followed in

Wyman v. Pan American Airways, Inc., 3 5 in which the court stated that the

Warsaw Convention did not create new substantive rights, but operated
within the framework of existing rights and remedies. 36 Neither the Choy nor
Wyman decision, however, cited any authority for its conclusion, and, subsequently, a contrary argument emerged.
In Salamon v. Koninklijke Luchvaart Maatschappij, N.V. '37 the court
construed article 17, which states that "[tihe carrier shall be liable" in the case
of an accident, 38 as the source of a cause of action for wrongful death. It cited
Garcia v. Pan American Airways, InC., 3 9 which found that the treaty was
self-executing, as "impliedly" holding that the Warsaw Convention creates a
cause of action. 40 The Salamon court, however, overlooked Garcia'sultimate
holding that the issues therein, including the choice of the applicable wrongful
death statute, were to be governed by the law of the forum .4 Consequently,
it is not surprising that Salamon had never been followed prior to Benjarains.42

Nevertheless, the purpose of article 17 was clarified by Judge Leibell in
32. See Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 24, at 499-500.
33. 1941 A.M.C. 483 (S.D.N.Y. 1941).
34. Id. at 487-88. Subsequent cases have held that the provisions of the Warsaw Convention
are in fact self-executing and do not require enabling legislation. See Indemnity Ins. Co. v. Pan
American Airways, 58 F. Supp. 338, 340 (S.D.N.Y. 1944); Garcia v. Pan American Airways,
Inc., 269 A.D. 287, 292, 55 N.Y.S.2d 317, 322 (1945), aff'd, 295 N.Y. 852, 67 N.E.2d 257, cert.
denied, 329 U.S. 741 (1946). See generaliy Bacardi Corp. v. Domenech, 311 U.S. IS0, 161
(1940). Unlike the United States, the United Kingdom has enacted enabling legislation. See notes
142-50 infra and accompanying text.
35. 181 Misc. 963, 43 N.Y.S.2d 420 (Sup. Ct. 1943), aff'd, 267 A.D. 947, 48 N.Y.S.2d 459,
aft'd, 293 N.Y. 878, 59 N.E.2d 785 (1944), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 882 (1945).
36. Id. at 966, 43 N.Y.S.2d at 423.
37. 107 N.Y.S.2d 768 (Sup. Ct. 1951), aff'd mem., 281 A.D. 965, 120 N.Y.S.2d 917 (1953).
38. Warsaw Convention, supra note 2, art. 17.
39. 269 A.D. 287, 55 N.Y.S.2d 317 (1945), aff'd, 295 N.Y. 852, 67 N.E.2d 257, cert. denied,
329 U.S. 741 (1946).
40. 107 N.Y.S.2d at 772-73. The Salamon court ignored the Wyman decision. See notes
35-36 supra and accompanying text.
41. 269 A.D. at 293, 55 N.Y.S.2d at 323.
42. Ironically, Judge Lumbard quoted this holding in Benjamin$, 572 F.2d at 916, while in
Noel v. Linea Aeropostal Venezolana, 247 F.2d 677 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 907 (1957),
he dismissed Salanon's significance in light of the strength of the Wyman decision.

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47

Komlos v. Compagnie Nationale Air France.43 Relying on the report of
Secretary of State Hull that was submitted with the Convention to the
Senate, 44 he held that, rather than create a cause of action for wrongful
death, article 17 created only a presumption of liability. The source of the
cause of action was to be determined by the law of the forum court. 45 Four
years later, in Noel v. Linea Aeropostal Venezolana, 4 6 the Second Circuit,
though aware that the plaintiff might be left without a remedy, followed
Komlos and held that the Convention did not create a cause of action for
wrongful death. 4 7 In spite of its harshness, Noel was followed for twenty-one
years without opposition, 48 until overruled by Benjamins.
The Noel rule also withstood several challenges in Congress. On two
occasions legislation was proposed that would have extended federal question
jurisdiction to all wrongful death and personal injury cases involving the
Warsaw Convention. The first occasion was in 1965 when the Senate held
hearings of ratification of the Hague Protocol. The Protocol was subject to
considerable opposition; many people thought that its limitation of liability to
approximately $16,000 per passenger was unconscionable by American standards of damage recovery. 49 In an attempt to alleviate this dissatisfaction, a
companion bill was proposed that would have required all American
carriers to insure each passenger for an additional $50,000. 50 This bill also
43. 111 F. Supp. 393 (S.D.N.Y. 1952), rev'd on other grounds, 209 F.2d 436 (2d Cir. 1953),
cert. denied, 348 U.S. 820 (1954).
44. In the report, Secretary of State Cordell Hull set forth the reasons in favor of adherence to
the Convention. He stated that "[t]he effect of article 17 . . . of the Convention is to create a
presumption of liability against the aerial carrier on the mere happening of an accident
occasioning injury or death of a passenger subject to certain defenses allowed under the
Convention to the aerial carrier ...
"The framers of the Warsaw Convention were, of course, confronted with the necessity of
taking into consideration the various legal systems and practices in different countries, and in the
interest of obtaining uniformity with respect to international air regulations compromises were
undoubtedly necessary. On the whole, it is believed that [what] the Convention adopted should
be regarded as acceptable as a basis for regulating international transportation of passengers,
baggage, and goods, and that any apparent departures from accepted procedure in this country
are not sufficiently serious to warrant a withholding of adherence to the Convention." Message
from the Presidentof the United States Transmitting aConventionfor the Unification of Certain Rules,
S. Exec. Doc. No. G, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934), reprinted in 1934 U.S. Av. 239, 243-44.
45. 111 F. Supp. at 402. Although Komlos was reversed on other grounds, the Second Circuit
affirmed the district court's holding that the national law of the forum court would determine if
the plaintiff had a cause of action for wrongful death. 209 F.2d at 438.
46. 247 F.2d 677 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 907 (1957).
47. Id. at 680.
48. See cases cited note 3 supra.
49. Hague Hearings, supra note 2, at 59-62 (statement of Stuart Speiser), 64, 69 (statement of
Lee Kreindler), 93 (statement of Harry Gair), 106 (supplementary statement of Lee Kxeindler). See
also 111 Cong. Rec. 20164-65 (remarks of Sen. Kennedy). 20375-76 (remarks of Rep. Wolff) (1965).
50. S. 2032, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965). This bill was challenged on the theory that it would
invite sabotage. The same attorneys who argued against adherence to the Protocol suggested that
compulsory insurance would provide anonymity to those passengers who would attempt suicide
by planting a bomb on an airplane so that their families would collect on the large insurance
policies they purchased prior to the flight. The compulsory insurance would eliminate the need to
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would have created a cause of action for all cases covered by the Convention.5 Nevertheless, the Hague Protocol was never ratified, and the companion bill was never passed.
In 1968 and 1969 the Senate again addressed the situation brought to light
by Noel when it conducted hearings on legislation to establish exclusive
federal question jurisdiction over all aircraft crash litigation.5 2 The bills were
drafted to be compatible with the Warsaw Conventions 3 and were supported
by the federal judiciary.54 Nevertheless, the legislation never passed, probably because of the opposition from plaintiffs' attorneys who expressed fears of
increased litigation costs5 5 and who believed that state laws should govern
wrongful death actions.5 6 As a result, the Noel rule remained intact, and cases
involving the Warsaw Convention were not within the ambit of federal
question jurisdiction.
III.

THE BENJAMiNS DECISION

A.

The Unifonnity Argument in Benjamins: National Law and
the Warsaw Convention
Despite the established strength of Noel, the Second Circuit, in Benjamins,
found that the Warsaw Convention did create a cause of action for wrongful
purchase insurance and prevent the FBI from tracing the saboteur. See Hague Hearings, supra
note 2, at 10 (statement of Leonard Meeker), 21 (statement of Najeeb Halahy), 53-54 (statement
of Stuart Tipton), 61 (statement of Stuart Speiser), 102 (statement of Brackley Shaw).
51. Leonard Meeker presented the position of the Department of State at the hearings.
Referring to Noel, he stated: "The proposed legislation would change this result, and would
expressly create a cause of action arising out of a treaty, which would be cognizable either in
State or Federal courts. The statute would thus bring about a uniform U.S. interpretation of the
convention, in line with its interpretation in other countries." Hague Hearings, supra note 2, at 6.
The difference of interpretation referred to by Mr. Meeker did not result from a misinterpretation
of the Convention by the American courts but because the United States, unlike England, did not
enact enabling legislation when it adhered to the Convention. For a discussion of the British
interpretation of the Convention, see notes 142-50 infra and accompanying text.
52. The legislation was designed to simplify litigation of air crash cases with the use of the
federal provisions for multidistrict litigation. Aircraft Crash Litigation: Hearings on S. 3305,
S. 3306 & S. 961 Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. and 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 9-10 (1968-1969)
[hereinafter cited as Aircraft Hearings] (remarks of Sen. Tydings, sponsor of the legislation). See
also id. at 1-9, 199-225.
53. See S. 3305, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. § 1407(b) (1968), reprinted in Aircraft Hearings, supra
note 52, at 1; S. 3306, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. § 2744(c) (1968), reprinted in Aircraft Hearings, supra
note 52, at 6; S. 961, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 1408(d) (1969), reprinted in Aircraft Hearings, supra
note 52, at 208.
54. Aircraft Hearings, supra note 52, at 11-25 (statement of Hon. Peirson Hall), 124-26
(statement of Hon. J. Skelly Wright), 134-40 (statement of Hon. Thomas Clary), 227-38
(statement of Hon. William Becker).
55. The attorneys believed that the airlines would be more inclined to offer larger settlements
at earlier dates if they were forced to defend claims in several different jurisdictions rather than in
one federal court. Id. at 163 (statement of Lee Kreindler), 174-76 (statement of Stuart Speiser &
Donald Madole), 242 (statement of Lee Kreindler).
56. Id. at 162-63 (statement of Lee Kreindler), 166 (statement of Milton Sincoff), 244-47
(statement of Lee Kreindler).
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death. 7 Moreover, the denial of a Convention-created cause of action for
wrongful death was inconsistent with its view of the Convention as an
"internationally binding body of uniform air law."' 8 The Benjamins majority
found that the debates that led to the adoption of the Warsaw Convention
clearly indicated that the delegates intended to create a uniform body of law
"with absolutely no reference to any national law (except for the questions of
standing to sue for wrongful death, effects of contributory negligence and
procedural matters . . .).-59 The Convention, however, contains several substantial concessions to national law, 60 and an examination of the history of
their development indicates that the delegates could not have intended to
create a cause of action for wrongful death and personal injury.
1. Contributory Negligence
Article 21 of the Convention specifies that the law of the forum court will
determine whether the negligence of a passenger will reduce his recovery by a
degree comparable to his own fault or act as a bar to any recovery. 6 I This
provision represents a compromise between civil law nations, which had
traditionally followed a doctrine of comparative fault, and common law
jurisdictions, which had traditionally followed the doctrine of contributory
negligence.
CITEJA, in its draft provision submitted to the Warsaw Conference, had
not included any provision regarding the negligence of a passenger. In
response, the United Kingdom proposed that the carrier be exonerated from
62
liability when the passenger's own negligence contributed to his injuries.
After considering the proposal, the drafting committee presented article 21 to
the delegates as a compromise, 63 and it was adopted in its present form.
Although article 21's effect would be contrary to a uniform application of
the Convention, the delegates agreed that the conceptual differences between
civil law and common law systems were so great that national law should
govern the issue of contributory fault.6 4 Moreover, they decided that it was
57.

572 F.2d at 919.

58. Id.at 917.
59. Id.
60. See Warsaw Convention, supra note 2, arts. 21 (contributory negligence of the passenger),
24(2) (who has the right of action), 25 (standard by which willful misconduct is defined), 28(2)
(questions of procedure), 29(2) (limitation on the time to sue). Two of these references were
omitted by the Benjamins majority.
61. "If the carrier proves that the damage was caused by or contributed to by the negligence
of the injured person the court may, in accordance with the provisions of its own law, exonerate
the carrier wholly or partly from his liability." Id. art. 21. Since the rules of liability set out In the
Convention are based on a theory of fault, the concepts of comparative fault and contributory
negligence are not adverse to the Convention's legal objectives. Second International Conference
on Private Aeronautical Law, October 4-12, 1929, Warsaw, Minutes 252 (R. Horner & D. Legrez
trans. 1975) [hereinafter cited as Warsaw Minutes].
62. Warsaw Minutes, supra note 61, at 252.
63. Id. at 208.
64. The Greek delegate pointed out the inequality inhercnt in article 21. In response, the Swiss
delegate argued that even if the Convention did establish a uniform rule, a judge will never
"apply other than his law." He noted that with article 21 "we satisfy the English proposal, and
we cannot come out against a national law which applies the common law. We create a
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beyond the purpose of the Convention to provide for cases in which the forum
court had no rule with respect to the negligence of the passenger. They felt
that the Convention
could only apply to the extent that it could refer to
65
national law.

This concession to national law was challenged at subsequent international
conferences that considered revision of the Convention. At the Rio De Janiero
Conference in 1953 it was proposed that, in the interest of uniformity, article6
21 be amended to provide for application of the rule of comparative fault."
By this time the United Kingdom had adopted a system of comparative
fault, 67 and only American courts continued to follow the common law
doctrine of contributory negligence. 68 The sole objection to this amendment
came from the United States delegate, Mr. G. Nathan Calkins, who stated
that serious problems would arise if article 21 were to conflict with the
existing law of the United States. 69 The proposal was narrowly rejected, and
article 21 remained intact when presented to the Hague Conference in 1955.
At The Hague, Greece, supported by the United Kingdom, Australia, and
France, renewed the proposal that the Convention adopt a test of comparative fault.7 0 Once again, Mr. Calkins urged the retention of a reference to
national law, 7 1 and this time the proposal was soundly rejected.7 2
possibility, but not an obligation; we say: rule out [the carrier's liability] or attenuate; if the
national law does not allow attenuation [i.e. a rule of comparative fault], we can do nothing
about it." Id. at 209.
65. When the Greek delegate proposed that provision be made for a forum that lacked any
national law on the question of contributory fault, Mr. Giannini, the president of the drafting
committee, stated: "[Where there is nothing, the Convention does not apply. If there is nothing in
your national law, it is not my fault. The Convention applies only inasmuch as one can refer to
national law." Id. at 208-09.
66. I Legal Committee, Ninth Session, Rio De Janiero, September, 1953, ICAO Doc. 7450LC/136, at 92 (1954) [hereinafter cited as Rio Minutes] (statement of Dr. Antonio Malintoppi,
delegate from the International Institute for the Unification of Private Law). The text of the
proposed amendment is printed in II Legal Committee, Ninth Session, Rio De Janiero, September, 1953, ICAO Doc. 7450-LC136, at 44 (1954) [hereinafter cited as Rio Documents].
67. See Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act, 1945, 8 & 9 Geo. 6, c. 28. See generally
28 Halsbury's Laws of England 87-89 (3d ed. 1959).
68. See I International Conference on Private Air Law, The Hague, September, 1955,
ICAO Doc. No. 7686-LC/140, at 263 (1956) [hereinafter cited as Hague Minutes) (statment of Dr.
Antonio Malintoppi).
69. He stated that these problems would "include consitutional difficulties." Rio Minutes,
supra note 66, at 93. Mr. Calkins added that the law of contributory negligence "was common law
in the United States which could not lightly be changed in accordance with American legislative
rules." Id.
70. Hague Minutes, supra note 68, at 261-63.
71. "[A] change requiring uniformity in the form proposed would have the effect of changing
the laws of [the United States]. The Conference should avoid making nonessential changes which
unnecessarily raised problems .... " Id. at 262.
72. Id. at 263. Dr. Malintoppi, who had proposed a similar amendment at the Rio
Conference, minimized the importance of the problem. "[Tlhe best thing would be to make no
change in the Warsaw Convention and wait until time passed, since it was possble that the
jurisprudence of the United States might take the right path." Id. The Guatemala Protocol did
not change the reference to national law on the question of contributory negligence. See
Guatemala Protocol, supra note 18, art. VII.
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The history of article 21 demonstrates that although the essential purpose of
the Warsaw Convention was to establish uniformity, the delegates realized
that the Convention could not act as an independent body of substantive law.
Extensive concessions to national law were required. It seems correct to
conclude, therefore, that under article 21 these defenses to a cause of
action, 73 as created by national law, will act to define or negate the carrier's
liability that is presumed by the Convention. '"4 Conversely, it seems illogical
to conclude that the Convention creates an independent cause of action.
Article 21 would then allow the substantive forum-created defenses to define
or negate an action which exists in and by reason of the Convention. If the
drafters at Warsaw had intended to create art independent uniform cause of
action they would not have subordinated it to the known inconsistencies of
their countries.
2. Who Has a Cause of Action for Wrongful Death?
Under article 24 of the Convention the determination of who possesses the
right of action for wrongful death and personal injury, and the damages they
may recover, is a question of national law of the forum court. 7s Reference was
made to national law because it was CITEJA's opinion that the issues were
76
beyond the scope of a convention on aeronautical law.

None of the delegates at Warsaw objected to this reference to national
law, 77 but at the Rio Conference, Mr. Garnault, the French delegate,
proposed that it be omitted. 78 He feared that plaintiffs might circumvent the
Convention's limitation of the carrier's liability by arguing that rights provided by national law were not subject to conditions and limitations of the
Convention. 79 In his view, even if the Convention were silent on the matter
73. In both British and American tort law, freedom from contributory fault was a basic
element of a cause of action in negligence. Any act of the plaintiff that was a proximate cause of
his injuries extinguished his right to sue. See 28 Halsbury's Laws of England 75 (3d ed. 1959)
(the plaintiff must "prove facts from which the proper inference is that the injury complained of
was the result of the defendant's negligence and not of his own"); W. Prosser, Handbook of
the Law of Torts § 65, at 416-18 (4th ed. 1971).
74. See note 23 supra and accompanying text.
75. Article 24 provides: "(1) In the cases covered by articles 18 and 19 any action for damages,
however founded, can only be brought subject to the conditions and limits set out in this
convention.
"(2) In the cases covered by article 17 the provisions of the preceding paragraph shall also
apply, without prejudice to the questions as to who are the persons who have the right to bring
suit and what are their respective rights." Warsaw Convention, supra note 2, art. 24. An early
commentator on the Convention interpreted the "without prejudice" clause of article 24 as
follows: "The question of whether the plaintiff has in fact a right of action, and if in the
affirmative, the extent of the obligation to be indemnified, will be decided by the court, using as
basis the international private law in force for the court seised of the case." D. Goedhuls,
National Airlegislations and the Warsaw Convention 270 (1937).
76. "It was not possible to find a satisfactory solution to this problem, and CITEJA (deemed]
that this question of private international law should be regulated independantly from the present
Convention." Warsaw Minutes, supra note 61, at 255 (report of Henri De Vos).
77. Id. at 211-12, 229, 277-78. A Swiss proposal to specify that the law of the nation of the
deceased apply received little attention or debate. Id.
78. Rio Minutes, supra note 66, at 140.
79. The quarrel was not with the reservation of the nation's right to determine who could
bring an action, but with the nation's prerogative to "determine 'their respective rights.' " Id.
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the determination of who possessed a cause of action for wrongful death
would be considered a question of national law. 80 In opposition to the
proposal, Mr. Calkins, the United States delegate, argued that absent a
reference in article 24 to the application of national law, judges questioning
the deletion might conclude that they had no right to consider the question of
who had a right to sue. 8 ' Major Beaumont,8 2 the British delegate, also
opposed revision of article 24 because the Convention would then conflict
with the rights created by the British wrongful death statute. 3 He stated that
the Convention had to remain compatible with the Anglo-Saxon systems of
law. 84 The French proposal was withdrawn,8 5 and article 24's reference to
national law was left intact by both the Hague and the Guatemala 6 Protocols.
The debates at the Rio Conference indicate that none of the delegates
intended the Convention to interfere with the rights created by wrongful
death statutes that existed in national law. Moreover, Major Beaumont's
discussion of some of the problems he faced while preparing the draft
revisions of the Convention leaves little doubt as to the effect of article 24
with regard to the creation of a cause of action by the Convention. 8 7 Because
article 24 did not create a cause of action and the plaintiff would be left
without a remedy in those fora that lacked any provision for wrongful death,
he suggested that the Convention specify the law to be applied in such a
case. 88 This proposal was never adopted. Nevertheless, this discussion demon80. "Obviously, it was the court seized of the case which would determine who were the
persons who had the right to bring suit ....
Id. "There was nothing in the Convention which
deprived national legislations of the entirely natural right to regulate the problems now being
dealt with by the Committee. The national laws were masters of their own problems and such a
provision as that found in the latter half of Article 24(2) was not required in the Convention." Id.
at 142. Mr. Garnault conceded, however, that the circumstances he feared did not result from the
language of the Convention but from the possibility that the forum courts might seek any
conceivable means of circumventing liability limitations they deemed insufficient. Id.
81. Id. at 142. Earlier, Mr. Ambrosini of Italy, who had been a delegate at the Warsaw
Conference, said that the Convention could not determine who had a right to sue. Id. at 140.
82. Major K. M. Beaumont was probably the most knowledgeable authority of his time on
the Warsaw Convention. He was an observer at Warsaw in 1929, prepared drafts and served as
reporter for the Madrid, Rio, and Hague Conferences in the 1950's, co-authored Shawcross &
Beaumont on Air Law, and, as a solicitor in London, handled many of the first Warsaw
Convention cases litigated in the United Kingdom.
83. See notes 149-50 infra and accompanying text.
84. "If Article 24(2) were not retained, there might be interference with the rights which arose
under the British Fatal Accidents Acts. An employer might be deprived from taking action for the
loss of services of an employee who had been killed or injured and, perhaps, Mr. Garnault might
not have considered the very unfortunate repercussions that his suggestion might have under
Anglo-Saxon systems of law." Rio Minutes, supra note 66, at 141. This interpretation, made in
1953, is consistent with the explicit provisions incorporated into the Carriage by Air Act, 1961,
9 & 10 Eliz. 2, c.27, discussed at notes 147-50 infra and accompanying text.
85. Rio Minutes, supra note 66, at 143.
86. Guatemala Protocol, supra note 18, art. IX.
87. Beaumont, Some Problems Involved in Revision of the Warsaw Convention, 16 J. Air L,
& Com. 14 (1949).
88. "Article 24 of the present Convention leaves open various legal doubts and difficultiesTherefore an entirely new Article has been suggested to provide (a) for the case when two or more
parties are entitled to claim in respect of the same death, injury, loss, damage or delay and (b) for
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strates that the Warsaw Convention was meant to be applied to existing
causes of action for wrongful death and not to create a new cause of action.8 9
3.

The Standard of Conduct That Will Negate the Limitation of Liability
Under article 22 of the Warsaw Convention a carrier's liability for the
death or injury of its passengers is limited, 90 except when it engages in
egregious conduct. Article 25 leaves the definition
of the applicable standard
9
of conduct to the law of the forum court. '
At the Warsaw Conference the delegates (lid not want to provide claimants
and the courts with a facile means of avoiding the Convention's damage
ceiling, 92 and, consequently, a vigorous debate ensued over the correct word 93
to
define the standard of conduct that would negate the carrier's protection.
The possibility of finding a single word or expression that could be uniformly
interpreted in all jurisdictions 94 seemed so remote, however, that the British
delegate proposed that reference be made to the national law of the place
where the contract of carriage was made. 95 Although many delegates were at
first opposed to the suggestion, 96 they eventually realized that unless a
the law to be applied in case the matter is not covered by the national law of the Court trying the
action, both in the case of death and in the case of all other claims." Id. at 18. Interestingly, these
remarks refer to "all" claims subject to the Convention, and include cargo and baggage claims as
well as wrongful death and personal injury actions.

89. Miller suggests one reason why the delegates may have neglected to provide for tile
problem envisioned by Major Beaumont. "It seems that most of the delegates at the Warsaw
Conference saw the situation as it was in France. There was no need to create a cause of action
since every plaintiff appeared to have one, based either in contract or in tort." G. Miller, supra
note 25, at 232. Under French law, "[fin
carriage by air, the cause of action will in most cases be
provided by the contract of carriage which can provide a basis for any action, be it wrongful
death, personal injury, delay or damage to baggage or cargo." Id. at 231 (footnote omitted).
90. Warsaw Convention, supra note 2, art. 22.
91. "The carrier shall not be entitled to avail himself of the provisions of this convention
which exclude or limit his liability, if the damage is caused by his wilful misconduct or by such
default on his part as, in accordance with the law of the court to which the case is submitted, is
considered to be equivalent to wilful misconduct." Id. art. 25(1).
92. They had to balance their desire to deprive a carrier that causes injury in an illicit or
reckless manner of the benefit of limited liability with their desire not to defeat the purpose of the
Convention.
93. Intertwined with the problem was the standard of conduct on the part of the carrier
which would make it liable for the reckless acts of its servants. Warsaw Minutes, supra note 61,
at 58-66. They eventually addressed this problem in article 25(2): "Similarly the carrier shall not
be entitled to avail himself of the said provisions, if the damage is caused under the same
circumstances by any agent of the carrier acting within the scope of his employment." Warsaw
Convention, supra note 2, art. 25(2).
94. The jurisprudence of the nations represented seemed to construe each proposed term with
a varying degree of definition. Although everyone agreed that the French word "dol" was the
most suitable, it could not be precisely translated into other languages. Warsaw Minutes, supra
note 61, at 59-61.
95. Id. at 63-64.
96. Id. at 64-66. This opposition occurred at the end of the third of the eight sessions of the
Warsaw Conference. In this session the delegates addressed the substance of the Convention for
the first time. The Italian and French delegations were adamantly opposed to any recourse to
national law at that early stage of the conference. The French delegate announced what he
thought was an agreement: "[W]e are absolutely opposed to a formula that would lead to the
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reference to national law were made, article 25 would not be adopted. 97 The
British proposal was modified to refer to the national law of the forum court9"
and was adopted by the Conference. 99
At The Hague in 1955 many delegates, bothered by the varied standards of
conduct that had developed in the courts of the signatory nations, argued that
it was necessary to define a standard of conduct so that article 25 would be
applied uniformly. 100 When the Department of State translated the Convention for use in the United States it employed the term "willful misconduct" as
the standard that would subject the carrier to unlimited liability.10 The
interpretation of willful misconduct that had developed in American courts
was important to plaintiffs' attorneys. They believed that their chances of
proving a carrier's willful misconduct were, in most cases, sufficient to induce
settlements in excess of article 22's limits.' 0 2 Although at The Hague Mr.
Calkins was not opposed to the adoption of a uniform rule, he was opposed to
that would be inconsistent with the law that had
any revision of the language
10 3
developed in America.
Nevertheless, article 25 was amended by the Hague Protocol so that
attempts to circumvent the limited damage provisions would be severely, if
not completely, restricted. 0 4 Consequently, during the hearings before the
United States Senate in 1965 concerning American ratification of the Hague
application of national law. It's the first time that application of national law is required, and if it
were allowed for this question, it would be required for others. From our point of view, one
would thus arrive in destroying the Convention, if one establishes recourse to national law upon
each article.
"We will be as conciliatory as possible on the formula to be adopted; we will develop it as much
as possible, but I beg the delegates not to enter upon this dangerous course which would consist
in reserving the result of the litigation to national law." Id. at 66. To this Mr. Clarke of Great
Britain replieh "We are quite in agreement, if one can find a formula." Id. Nevertheless, as the
Conference progressed, the delegates realized that the Convention would not be accepted unless it
made substantial concessions to national law. See note 60 supra and accompanying text.
97. The drafting committee had been asked to formulate language without referring to
national law. Warsaw Minutes, supra note 61, at 66. Later, when presenting article 25, Mr.
Giannini, president of the committee, stated that the use of a reference to the national law for the
definition of the standard of conduct was the only solution that would satisfy all of the delegates
to the Conference. Id. at 212-14.
98. On the second presentation of article 25 no one objected to the reference to the national
law of the forum court. See id.
99. Id. at 229-30.
100. Hague Minutes, supra note 68, at 192-200.
101. See note 91 supra.
102. See Hague Hearings, supra note 2, at 11-12 (statement of Leonard Meeker), 59
(statement of Stuart Speiser), 65-67, 75 (statements of Lee Kreindler), 82-83 (statement of Charles
Robbins), 107-08 (supplementary statement of Lee Kreindler).
103. Hague Minutes, supra note 68, at 196-97.
104. The Hague amendment reads as follows: "The limits of liability specified in Article 22
shall not apply if it is proved that the damage resulted from an act or omission of the carrier, his
servants or agents, done with intent to cause damage or recklessly and with knowledge that
damage would probably result; provided that, in the case of such act or omission of a servant or
agent, it is also proved that he was acting within the scope of his employment." Hague Protocol.
supra note 16, art. XIII. See also authority cited note 102 supra.
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Protocol, 10 5 several plaintiffs' attorneys testified that, although the Protocol's
damage limitation was twice as great as the Convention's, if the Protocol were
ratified one of their means of recovering unlimited damages 10 6 would be lost.
They preferred to forgo the Protocol's higher damage limitation, rather than
to lose the interpretation of willful misconduct that had developed in the
United States. 0 7 Because of substantial opposition to the Hague Protocol it
has never been ratified by the United States and has no effect here. 10 8
In this country, therefore, the law of the forum court provides the definition
of a carrier's willful misconduct. Although the Hague Protocol changed the
Convention's concession to national law, the debates at the Hague Conference
show that the rationale for this change was to protect the airline industry from
excessive damage awards rather than to create a uniform body of substantive
law.
Because the definition of the egregious conduct standard in the Warsaw
Convention is left to the admittedly divergent laws of the contracting nations,
national law can conceivably be used to undermine the purposes of the
damage limitation. Article 25's effect on this essential element of the Convention seems inconsistent with any intention of the delegates at Warsaw to
create an independent uniform cause of action.
4.

The Enforceability and Res Judicata Effect of Judgments

Although the CITEJA draft of the Convention specified that all actions for
the death or personal injury of the same passenger be litigated in a single
court,' 0 9 the absence in the draft of provisions relating to the enforceability
and res judicata effect of judgments created considerable controversy at the
Warsaw Conference. Many delegates believed that the carrier would need
protection against suits for the wrongful death of the same passenger brought
by different claimants in different jurisdictions. 1 0 They feared that the
aggregate amount of judgments against the carrier might exceed the carrier's
limited liability for the death of any one passenger.
CITEJA had attempted to solve this problem in its draft, but, absent a
corollary provision for the enforcement of judgments, one claimant might
have been denied recovery because another claimant had previously filed suit
in a jurisdiction where the carrier had no assets."' After a lengthy debate" 2
105. See notes 49-57 supra and accompanying text.
106. The other method was to argue that the passenger ticket did not provide adequate notice
of the liability limitation. See Lisi v. Alitalia-Linee Italiane, S.p.A., 370 F.2d 508 (2d Cir. 1966)
(notice of liability limitation printed on ticket in "lilliputian" size print), qff'd by an equally
divided Court, 390 U.S. 455 (1968). The carriers, however, corrected this problem by changing
their tickets.
107. Hague Hearings, supra note 2, at 59 (statement of Stuart Speiser), 75 (statement of Lee
Kreindler), 83 (statement of Charles Robbins). Moreover, these attorneys stated that their true
preference was the complete denunciation of the Warsaw Convention by the United States. Id.
108. See note 16 supra.
109. Warsaw Minutes, supra note 61, at 266.
110. For example, a decedent's spouse could bring an action in one country while the
decedent's children were bringing an action in a different country. Moreover, differences In
wrongful death statutes might prompt an adopted or illegitimate child to sue in a jurisdiction
different from that in which the decedent's natural children were bringing an action.
111. Under the CITEJA provision not only would that subsequent claimant be precluded
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the delegates rejected the CITEJA proposal 13 and article 28 was adopted
without a res judicata or an enforcement of judgments provision.
The issue of enforceability was raised again at the Hague Conference. After
strong opposition from the United States delegation, however, the delegates
decided merely to recommend that the question be studied by another
conference. 1 14 Thus, neither the Warsaw Convention nor the Hague Protocol
provides protection for the claimant who obtains a judgment against a carrier
in one jurisdiction but needs to execute it in another, or for the carrier that is
faced with multiple claims in different countries for the same death.I 5 At
both conferences the prevailing argument against the provisions for the
enforcement and res judicata effect of judgments was that they were not
6
within the scope of the Convention and should be considered elsewhere.'"
Nevertheless, provisions for res judicata and enforcement are essential
elements of all judgments. If the delegates intended to create an independent
cause of action that would be recognized as uniform and identical in each of
the adhering nations, they also would have intended that any judgments on
that cause of action be similarly recognized. Their refusal to provide for either
enforcement or the res judicata effect of judgments indicates that they had no
intent to create an independent cause of action.
5. Summary
At Warsaw, two delegates proposed that provision be made for specific
issues not covered by the rules of the Convention." 7 This provision was
thought to be unnecessary, however, since it was clear "that this Convention
does not provide for the entire matter . . . ,,.t1 Thus, the delegates were
clearly aware that they could not expect the Convention to cover every issue
of aviation litigation. Because of their appreciation of the substantial differences among the legal systems of the world, the delegates expressly refrained
from governing issues unrelated to the particular problems of international

from suing in a jurisdiction where he could satisfy a judgment, but the lack of a provision for the

enforcement of judgments would impair his ability to execute any judgment rendered by the court
first vested with the case. See id.
112. Various proposals were made to alleviate this problem. They ranged from the British

proposal to restrict treaty jurisdiction to the domicile of the carrier, id. at 118, to the German
proposal that any judgment rendered by a competent court be enforced without need to retry the
merits of the case. Id. at 123.
113. Id.at 125.
114. Hague Minutes, supra note 68, at 260-61. Miss Colclaser, speaking for the American
delegation, was not only adamantly opposed to any provision for the execution of judgments but
to further study of the question by the ICAO Legal Committee. Id. at 260.
115. See generally D. Goedhuis, supra note 75, at 289-92.
116. See Warsaw Minutes, supra note 61, at 119-20; Hague Minutes, supra note 68, at
260-61.
117. The Czechoslovakian and Yugoslavian delegations made these proposals. Under the
Czechoslovakian proposal each nation would have applied its national law relative to carriage in the
absence of provisions in the text of the Convention. Warsaw Minutes, supra note 61, at 176.
118. Id. at 188. Mr. Giannini, president of the drafting committee, remarked that the limited
character of the Convention would be made clear with the use of the word "certain" in its title. Id.
at 176; see note 2 supra.
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aviation accident liability.' 19 Similarly, the minutes of the Conferences at Rio
De Janeiro and The Hague reveal that Mr. Calkins and the United States
delegation were reluctant to recommend adherence to a120 treaty that would

replace or substantially modify existing American law.
Although the creation of an independent uniform cause of action could not
be within the purpose of the Convention, uniformity with regard to its
primary purpose was not in jeopardy. The Convention's damage limitation
could be incorporated into any legal system without conflicting with any of its
legal principles. The carrier's liability is limited no matter who has the right to
sue and no matter how their cause of action is founded.
B.

The Uniformity Argument in Reed v. Wiser

The Benjamins majority also stated 12 1 that the denial of a Conventioncreated cause of action would be inconsistent with the Second Circuit's
119. Nearly all of the problems addressed at Warsaw were unique to the liability situations
engendered by international air transportation. The delegates were reluctant to formulate rules
that were not necessary to a convention on aeronautical law. See, e.g., Warsaw Minutes, supra
note 61, at 170, 173-74 (statements of Mr. Giannini, president of the drafting committee). For
instance, questions of procedure were left to the law of the forum court. Warsaw Convention,
supra note 2, art. 28(2). Article 28 limited the jurisdictions where an action could be brought to
fora in which the carrier could expect to be sued at the time it entered into the contract of
carriage. See note 7 supra. The British were opposed to the CITEJA provision that suit be
allowed in the jurisdiction of the place of the accident, Warsaw Minutes, supra note 61, at 266,
because in cases of flights over several countries the location of the accident is fortuitous and not
within the contemplation of either the passenger or the carrier. See id. at 113. Absent such a
provision, however, the carrier was assured that it would not be sued in a nation whose judicial
procedures were unorganized.
Given article 28, a carrier may avoid treaty jurisdiction in any given country by not
maintaining its domicile or principal place of business there, by not entering into any contracts of
carriage there, and by refusing to enter into any contract of carriage in which that country is
designated as the place of destination. The Convention provides that nothing in the treaty will
prevent the carrier from refusing to enter into a contract of carriage. Warsaw Convention, supra
note 2, art. 33. Once these safeguards were established the delegates had little concern for tle
operation of the forum court's procedures.
For instance, the Convention also does not address the case in which the law of the forum court
is to apply the substantive law of another court. Such a situation would have occurred in the United
States where courts applied the law of the place of the accident. See, e.g., Komlos v. Compagnie
Nationale Air France, 209 F.2d 436, 438 (2d Cir. 1933), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 820 (1954), It
would appear that under the Convention the forum court was free to do so as long as the
conditions and limitations of the Convention were complied with. See, e.g., G. Miller, supra note
25, at 248; Sack, InternationalUnification of Private Law Rules on Air Transportationand the
Warsaw Convention, 4 Air L. Rev. 345, 384-88 (1933). See generally D. Goedhuis, supra note 75,
at 286-88.
The Convention's final reference to national law is article 29(2), the limitation on the time to
sue. The CITEJA draft had provided that national law would govern "the causes of suspension
and interruption of the period of limitation," Warsaw Minutes, supra note 61, at 267, but Mr.
Giannini feared that such a provision would be detrimental to the carrier because the right to sue
for damages might be delayed indefinitely. Id. at 110-13. Consequently, the law of the forum
determines whether the action has been timely commenced and article 29(1) limits any right to
two years. Id. at 171; see D. Goedhuis, supra note 75, at 294-95.
120. See notes 69, 71, 81, 103, 114 supra and accompanying text.
121. 572 F.2d at 917.
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decision in Reed v. Wiser.1 2 2 In Reed, the plaintiffs sued employees of an
airline, arguing that the liability limitations of article 22 were available to the
carrier only. 123 They were aware that the airline would indemnify the
defendants for any judgment awarded against them. '2 4 The court, however,
rejected this attempt to circumvent the damage limitation and held that since
one of the clear and unequivocal purposes of the Convention was to limit the
liability of the carrier, the Convention
should be interpreted so that this
1 2S
intention was uniformly applied.
As noted by Judge Van Graafeiland in his dissent in Benjarnins, the Reed
12 6
decision does not suggest that the Convention creates a cause of action.
The Reed court held that the purpose of the Warsaw Convention was 12to
7impose certain conditions and limitations on every possible cause of action,
and its reasoning implies that, at that time, the Second Circuit recognized that
there could be several sources of a cause of action subject to the Convention.
The Benjamins court, on the other hand, held that the Warsaw Convention
was the single source of an independent cause of action. It is submitted that,
contrary to the contentions of the majority, Benjamins is actually inconsistent
with Reed.
C. The Commentators' View of the Delegates' Intentions
Although the minutes to the Warsaw Conference do not explicitly indicate
whether the delegates intended to create a cause of action for wrongful death,
the observation by the Benjamins majority-that some commentators attribute this silence to an assumption by the delegates that "the Convention itself
supplied the cause of action" 1 28-requires
qualification. First, the commentators relied on by the court, Messrs. Lowenfeld and Mendelsohn, were not
referring to the time of the drafting of the Convention in 1929, but to the
period in the early 1960's when ratification of the Hague Protocol was under
consideration by the United States Senate. Second, the commentators' statement is inaccurate. The American proponents of the Hague Protocol knew
that the Convention did not create a cause of action, and, therefore, drafted
2 9
companion legislation that would have created one.'
122.

555 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 922 (1977).

123. Id. at 1081.
124. Id. at 1090.
125. Id. at 1092.
126. 572 F.2d at 922 n.5 (Van Graafeiland, J., dissenting). Judge Van Graafeiland sat on both
the Reed and Benjamins panels. The Reed decision was unanimous.
127. 555 F.2d at 1084-85.
128. 572 F.2d at 917 n.8 (citing Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 24, at 517).
129. See notes 50-51 supra and accompanying text. When he presented the position of the
Department of State on the compulsory insurance bill at the Hague Hearings, Leonard Meeker
(who was accompanied at the hearings by his acting deputy Mr. Lowenfeld) testified that "[i]t
had always been assumed that the Warsaw Convention, by providing in article 17 that 'the
carrier shall be liable . . .' and by providing in article 28 for the place where action could be
brought had secured a clause [sic] of action to Warsaw passengers on [sic] their surviviors in all
cases covered by the Warsaw Convention." Hague Hearings, supra note 2, at 6. Mr. Meeker,
however, like Messrs. Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn and the Benjamins majority, never identifies
those parties who made such an assumption.
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The court also referred to an article written by G. Nathan Calldns in 1959130
as support for its conclusion. 131 In his article, Calkins points to "overwhelming" evidence that the draftsmen of the Convention intended to create a cause
of action. 132 Calkins argues that the delegates feared that national
law would require application of the doctrine of lex loci delicti, as was then
the law in the United States. Therefore, he reasons, the delegates must have
intended to create an independent cause of action to prevent such a result.
There are, however, several flaws in the Calkins argument. There is no
indication in the Warsaw minutes that the doctrine of lex loci delicti was ever
contemplated by the delegates. The United States did not send a delegate to
Warsaw and the minutes do not contain any references to the peculiar legal
situation created by the multiplicity of jurisdictions in this country. In
addition, the laws of many countries represented at Warsaw did not apply the
doctrine of lex loci delicti in the case of a foreign accident. In Great Britain,
for example, the courts had retreated from the doctrine since the turn of the
century, especially when its application would work to the detriment of one of
the parties. 133 In France, at the time of the Convention, an accident was
deemed a breach of the contract of carriage, 134 which indicates that France
would apply the law of the place of the contract 135
rather than the law of the
place of the accident in carrier liability actions.
The Calkins article also seems less than objective in its presentation of
evidence, 136 and many available facts are simply not mentioned. Although
130. Calkins, The Cause of Action Under the Wa,-saw Convention (pts. 1-2), 26 J. Air L. &
Com. 217, 323 (1959).
131.

572 F.2d at 917 n.8.

132. Calkins, supra note 130, at 218, 227. A reading of Calkins' article indicates that
although his stated purpose is to argue that the Convention creates a cause of action, his
arguments are founded on his dislike of the choice of law doctrine of lex loci delicti. His
"evidence" merely demonstrates that the delegates did not wish to require that the law of the
place of the accident would apply when an issue was left to national law. See, e.g., id. at 231-32,
234, 236, 343. In fact, the final paragraph of the two-part article addresses only the ills of the lex
loci delicti doctrine and is silent with regard to the Convention. Id. at 343.
133. See Machado v. Fontes, [1897] 2 Q.B. 231. A recent case in the House of Lords detailing
the history of this doctrine is Chaplin v. Boys, [1971] A.C. 356. See generally 8 Halsbury's Laws
of England 426-31 (4th ed. 1974).
134. See G. Miller, supra note 25, at 235-37. In France an action in contract is apparently the
exclusive form of civil action recognized in Warsaw cases. Id. at 235-37.
135. The traditional rule in contract cases is to apply the law of the place of the contract. See,
e.g., Milliken v. Pratt, 125 Mass. 374 (1876); Restatement of Conflict of Laws § 332 (1934).
136. Calkins supports his arguments as to the intent of the delegates at Warsaw by reasoning
that the legal purpose of the Convention was not substantially modified between the time It was
drafted by CITEJA and the time the treaty was adopted by the Conference. See, e.g., Calkins,
supra note 130, at 221, 223 (discussion of article 23 of the CITEJA draft), 224 (discussion of
article 27 of the CITEJA draft), 227. The minutes of the Warsaw Conference, however, Indicate
that the initial intention to create a comprehensive body of law was superseded by the desire to
adopt a treaty that could be applied in all nations in spite of their conceptually diverse legal
systems. See notes 118-21 supra and accompanying text. Calkins' reliance on his own translation
of the minutes of the CITEJA meetings and the Warsaw Conference is also questionable.
Although Calkins chose the English vocabulary for these translations, he frequently points to and
emphasizes particular phrases in his translations which "convince" him of the "intent" of CITEJA
and the Warsaw delegates.
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Mr. Calkins was the chairman of the United States delegations to the Madrid
Conference in 1951, the Rio Conference in 1953 and the Hague Conference in
1955, his article, written in 1959, does not refer to any of those proceedings.
For instance, the delegates at The Hague discussed Kornlos v. Compagnie
Nationale Air France,137 which held that the Convention did not create a
cause of action for wrongful death. The French delegate explained that the case
had been correctly decided because the Convention required the application of
the law of the forum to determine whether the claimants had a cause of action
for wrongful death. 1 38 The United States delegation did not respond to this
explanation and it was apparently acceptable to the other delegates because
discussion on the matter was ended.' 39 Nevertheless, Calkins completely
ignores the discussion and approval of the Konilos case at The Hague and
argues that the decision was contrary to the purposes of the Convention.
Calkins also argues that the references to national law in the Warsaw
Convention are not substantial. Yet this belies his own statements on behalf
of the United States at the Rio and Hague Conferences that the replacement of
several of those references with uniform provisions was unacceptable because
14 1
40
In spite of these inconsistencies,
it would interfere with existing law.'
however, many of Calkins' arguments appear in the Benjamins decision.

For example, one of Calkins' semantical arguments is his claim that the State Department
mistranslated the official French text of article 24. (This translation of article 24 is quoted at note
75 supra.) The French text reads as follows: "(1) Dans les cas prvus aux articles 18 et 19 toute
action en responsibiltE A quelque titre que ce soit, ne peut itre exerc6e que dans les conditions et
limites prvues par ]a prsente Convention." 49 Stat. 3006 (1934). Calkins feels that although the
term "conditions," which appears in both the British and American translations, is a proper
translation of the "English legal sense" of the French term "conditions," the translation which
more accurately reflects the apparent intent of CITEJA is "fundamental basis." Calkins, supra
note 130, at 226 & n.21. Calkins then argues that because article 24 provides that the
Convention is the fundamental basis of an action, the Convention must create the cause of
action. Id. at 226. In support of his argument, Calkins provides his translation of a CITEJA
debate in which "basis of the convention" or some variation thereof is employed throughout. Id.
137. 111 F. Supp. 393 (S.D.N.Y. 1952), rev'd on other grounds, 209 F.2d 436 (2d Cir. 1953),
cert. denied, 348 U.S. 820 (1954), discussed at notes 43-45 supra and accompanying text.
138. The question of Komlos arose when the British delegate expressed concern that the
United States had subordinated the Warsaw Convention to the law of the forum. Hague Minutes,
supra note 68, at 315-16. The French delegate stated that Komlos addressed the question of
"whether the claimants had a right of action and were entitled to claim compensation," id. at
316, and that the issue "had been settled outside the Convention as was permitted by the
Convention." Id.
139. See id. at 316-17. The British had proposed an article that would have required the
application of the Convention in all cases involving international transportation as defined in
article 1. Id. at 314. This provision was deemed unnecessary by the other delegates. Id. at 317.
140. See notes 69, 71, 81, 103 supra and accompanying text.
141. Although Calkins adamantly argues that the Convention creates an independent cause of
action which supersedes the application of national law, he does not apply his argument
universally. Calkins, supra note 130, at 340-41. "[A] wholly different set of considerations arises
when the place of the wrong is the high seas." Id. at 340. Calkins realizes that his Conventioncreated cause of action could not coexist with the exclusive remedy of the Death on the High Seas
Act, 46 U.S.C. § 761 (1970). Calkins, supra note 130, at 340-41.
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D. The Warsaw Convention in Great Britain
An example of the Benjamins court's reliance on Calkins is its reference to
the law of the United Kingdom, which it considered "compelling" evidence
that the Warsaw Convention created a cause of action for wrongful death. 142
Calkins states that in Britain "all doubt has been removed that liability is
created by the Convention.' 143 Both Calkins and the Second Circuit assume
that the Convention and the Carriage by Air Act of 1932,144 which incorporated the Convention into the national law of Britain, are one and the
same.' 45 This assumption is incorrect. The Carriage by Air Act of 1932
consists of six provisions of enabling legislation and two appended schedules.
The First Schedule is the text of the Convention and the Second Schedule
consists of provisions similar to a wrongful death statute.' 46 The text of the
entire Act indicates that only the liability of the carrier arises out of the
Convention; the Second Schedule creates the cause of action.
Moreover, an examination of the Carriage by Air Act of 1961,'147 which
replaced the 1932 Act, reveals more conclusive evidence that the United
Kingdom never interpreted the text of the Convention to create a cause of
action for wrongful death. The primary purpose of the 1961 Act was the
incorporation of the Hague Protocol into British law, but, in addition, major
alterations were made in the process by which the provisions of the Convention were to be enforced. The Second Schedule of the earlier Act was replaced
by a provision that any occurrence that gave rise to liability under
article 17 in the Warsaw Convention was to be considered a "wrongful act"'148
as referred to in Britain's general wrongful death act-the Fatal Accidents
Act. 14 9 The 1961 Act has been interpreted to provide that the liability
presumed in the Convention gives rise to a cause of action created by the
wrongful death statute.150 Thus, in Britain, the cause of action is created by
142.

See 572 F.2d at 918-19.

143. Calkins, supra note 130, at 324.
144. 22 & 23 Geo. 5, c. 36, reprinted in C. Shawcro.;s & K. Beaumont, Air Law 681-92 app.
2 (2d ed. 1951) [hereinafter cited as Air Law].
145. 572 F.2d at 918-19; Calkins, supra note 130, at 324.
146. The Second Schedule is entitled "Provisions as to Liability of Carrier in the Event of the
Death of a Passenger." The first paragraph of the schedule names those who shall have a right to
enforce any liability of the carrier. The second paragraph provides that "[a]n action to enforce the
liability may be brought .... 22 & 23 Geo. 5, c. 36, sched. 2 (1932), reprinted in Air Law, supra
note 144, at 692. The only reference to the Convention in the Second Schedule is with respect to
the limitation of damages. Paragraph 4 provides: "The Court before which any such action is
brought may at any stage of the proceedings make any such order as appears to the Court to be
just and equitable in view of the provisions of the First Schedule to this Act limiting the liability
of a carrier . . . ." Id.
147. 9 & 10 Eliz. 2, c. 27, reprintedin C. Shawcross & K. Beaumont, supra note 20, app. B,
at 53-71.
148. Id. § 3, reprinted in C. Shawcross & K. Beaumont, supra note 20, app. B, at 54.
149.

1976, c. 30.

150. C. Shawcross & K. Beaumont, supra note 20, at 427. In examining the question of
whether the Convention creates a cause of action in the various legal systems of the world, one
commentator states that "[t]he new provision extends the scope of the Fatal Accidents Act 1846
(i.e. Lord Campbell's Act) so that it will provide a cause of action for any occurrence which gives
rise to the carrier's liability. Thus it is now impossible to argue that it is the Convention which
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the wrongful death act and not by the Convention. Nevertheless, the Benjamins majority, neglecting the 1932 Act's reference to the Second Schedule and
the 1961 Act's reference to the Fatal Accidents Act, stated otherwise.151
E. Wrongful Death Statutes and the Warsaw Convention
The relationship between the Convention and the Fatal Accidents Act in
the new Carriage by Air Act is also significant in light of the history of the
cause of action for wrongful death. As Judge Van Graafeiland argued in his
dissent in Benjamins, no action for wrongful death can be sustained without
the existence of a statute authorizing the suit.

52

The Fatal Accidents Act was

designed to create a cause of action for wrongful death, and it has remained
the sole source of a wrongful death action in Britain. Similarly, every state
of the United States has created a statutory cause of action for wrongful
death. 153
Even if one were to assume that the Warsaw Convention does create a
cause of action, it lacks all the essential elements of a wrongful death
statute. 154 As a set of conditions and limitations, the Convention can easily be
applied to a state-created cause of action for wrongful death or personal
injury. Conversely, however, if the Convention creates an independent cause
of action, there is no statutory basis in the United States for the determination
of who may sue for wrongful death and what damages are recoverable.' 55
The Benjamins majority, however, failed to specify how this Conventionprovides a cause of action in cases of wrongful death." G. Miller, supra note 25, at 229 (emphasis
in original).
151. 572 F.2d at 918-19. The majority quoted the following text from the lengthiest of the
enabling provisions of the 1932 Act entitled "Provisions of Convention to have force of law":
"Any liability imposed by Article seventeen of the said First Schedule [the Convention] on a
carrier in respect of the death of a passenger shall be in substitution for any liability of the carrier
in respect of the death of that passenger either under any statute or at common law...." 22 & 23
Geo. 5, c. 36, reprinted in Air Law, supra note 144, at 682. The court omitted the following
language of the enabling provision: "[Tihe provisions set out in the Second Schedule to this Act
shall have effect with respect to the persons by and for whose benefit the liability so imposed is
enforceable and with respect to the manner in which it may be enforced." Id.
152. 572 F.2d at 921 (Van Graafeiland, J.,dissenting). No action for wrongful death exists at
common law. Baker v. Bolton, 1 Camp. 493, 170 Eng. Rep. 1033 (K.B. 1808). See generally W.
Prosser, supra note 73, § 127, at 901-14; 1 S.Speiser, Recovery for Wrongful Death § 1:1 (2d ed.
1975). But see Gaudette v. Webb, 362 Mass. 74, 284 N.E.2d 222 (1972). Massachusetts, however, is
the only state where an action for wrongful death has been created at common law. The New York
Court of Appeals has recently declined to change the traditional rule. Ratka v. St. Francis Hospital,
44 N.Y.2d 604, 378 N.E.2d 1027, 407 N.Y.S.2d 458 (1978).
153. For a list of state statutes see 2 S. Speiser, supra note 152, at 644-787, app. A.
154. The wrongful death statutes create a cause of action, designate those persons who
possess the right to enforce that action, and define the nature of the damages recoverable. See id.
The Warsaw Convention not only lacks these three essential elements but article 24(2) expressly
provides that the Convention is to apply "without prejudice" to the question of who possesses a
right of action and to the nature of damages they may recover. See note 75 supra and
accompanying text. Also, a wrongful death statute applies only to a preexisting source of liability,
e.g., negligence; it does not establish a rule for the creation of that liability. The cause of
action for wrongful death under the applicable national law applies to article 17's presumption of
liability. See note 23 supra and accompanying text.
155. See 572 F.2d at 922 (Van Graafeiland, J., dissenting).
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created cause of action is to be implemented. Presumably, it left this problem
to the development of a federal common law, either by the creation of a
federal common law wrongful death action or by the development of proceapplying rules that already exist in the state-created causes of
dures for
5 6
action. 1

Problems may also arise in state courts when they are faced with Warsaw
Convention cases. The Second Circuit did not determine whether the newly
recognized federal cause of action is to operate in conjunction with, or
independent of, the existing state-created rights. If the Warsaw Convention
cause of action is exclusive, the state court cannot apply its own law for
wrongful death. The existence of these problems, however, is not surprising;
the debates concerning the revision of the Convention clearly demonstrate
was not meant to replace existing causes of action for
that the Convention
57
wrongful death. '

Seth v. British Overseas Airways Corp. and Article 30(3) of the
Convention
In searching for a cause of action, the Benjanins majority' 58 relied on, by
analogy, article 30(3) of the Convention and the First Circuit's opinion in Seth
v. British Overseas Airways Corp. 159 Article 30 deals with contracts of
carriage that are to be performed by successive carriers. 160 In cases involving
the loss, damage, or delay of baggage or cargo, article 30(3) states when the
passenger, consignor, or consignee "shall have a right of action." 16 1 It is the
only provision in the Convention that employs such language. In Seth, the
court found that the language of article 30(3) created a cause of action for the
loss, damage, or delay of baggage or cargo during carriage by successive
carriers. 162 The decision in Seth, which had not been cited prior to BenjaF.

156. In finding that the Warsaw Convention creates a cause of action for wrongful death, the
Benjamins court ignored the issue of how the federal or state courts are to determine who has a
right to bring an action under the Warsaw Convention. Although they found a Conventioncreated right of action for the death of Hilde Benjamins, they never looked to see, nor did they
ask the district court to determine, whether Abraham Benjamins, as personal representative of
the estate, had a right to bring it.
157. See notes 88-89 supra and accompanying text.
158. 572 F.2d at 918.
159. 329 F.2d 302 (Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 858 (1964),
160. Article 30(1) provides: "In the case of transportation to be performed by various
successive carriers and falling within the definition set out in the third paragraph of article 1, each
carrier who accepts passengers, baggage or goods shall be subject to the rules set out In this
convention, and shall be deemed to be one of the contracting parties to the contract of
transportation insofar as the contract deals with that part of the transportation which is
performed under his supervision." Warsaw Convention, supra note 2, art. 30(1).
161. "As regards baggage or goods, the passenger or consignor shall have a right of action
against the first carrier, and the passenger or consignee who is entitled to delivery shall have a
right of action against the last carrier, and further, each may take action against the carrier who
performed the transportation during which the destruction, loss, damage, or delay took place.
These carriers shall be jointly and severally liable to the passenger or to the consignor or
consignee." Id. art. 30(3).
162. 329 F.2d at 305. Like Mr. Benjamins, Mr. Seth was an alien attempting to sue an alien
airline in the federal court, and diversity jurisdiction could not be sustained,
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rinns, 163 makes no reference to any other authority or to the Warsaw Conference.
Nevertheless, even if Seth is correct it should be limited to its facts because
article 30(3) refers specifically to baggage and cargo. Article 30(2), however,
which deals with the carriage of passengers by successive carriers, restricts the
right to sue, rather than state that a passenger has a right of action. A passenger
"can take action only against the carrier who performed" the relevant transportation. 164 In addition, although an examination of the baggage provisions of the
Convention is beyond the scope of this discussion, it should be noted that these
provisions are more detailed than those dealing with the carrier's liability for
injuries to passengers. 165
G. Policy Considerations
Although there is dubious justification for reliance on considerations of
policy unique to the United States to interpret the purposes of an international
multilateral convention, 166 the Benjamins majority advanced several policy
arguments in support of its conclusion.' 67 In any event, the policy considerations advanced by the court lack merit.
The majority expressed fears that claimants would be left without redress if
the Convention did not create a cause of action.1 68 Although under the
peculiar facts of Noel v. Linea Aeropostal Venezolana' 69 such a result was
possible, recent developments in the law of this country-for example, the
decline of the doctrine of lex loci delicti 17 0-have rendered such problems
163. In a district court case with similar facts in the same circuit as Seth, the court, without
citing Seth, held that federal question jurisdiction was not applicable. Fabiano Shoe Co. v.
Alitalia Airlines, 380 F. Supp. 1400 (D. Mfass. 1974).
164. "In the case of transportation of this nature, the passenger or his representative can take
action only against the carrier who performed the transportation during which the accident or the
delay occurred, save in the case where, by express agreement, the first carrier has assumed
liability for the whole journey." Warsaw Convention, supra note 2, art 30(2).
165. See id. arts. 4-16. See generally H. Drion, Limitation of Liabilities in International Air
Law 135-36 (1954); G. Miller, supra note 25, at 249-56.
166. "The holding that the Warsaw Convention does not create a cause of action has the
effect of subjecting Warsaw cases to all the uncertainties affecting the question in the United
States where the issue can become quite complex because of the federal structure of the country
.... But despite the possible importance of a decision on jurisdiction upon the final outcome of a
case, the question of jurisdiction... does not relate to the interpretation of the Convention itself
but is a question of municipal law of the United States." G. Miller, supra note 25, at 228
(footnotes omitted).
167. 572 F.2d at 919.
168. Id. at 918 n.9.
169. 247 F.2d 677 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 907 (1957), discussed at notes 47-48 supra
and accompanying text. The Noel case arose out of an accident in which the aircraft crashed into
the ocean. Therefore, applying the doctrine of lex loci delicti, the court held that the only remedy
would be in admiralty. See id. at 680.
170. In a number of cases involving accidents that occurred in states with statutory limitations on wrongful death recovery, courts declined to apply the doctrine of lex loci delicti. See,
e.g., Gore v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 373 F.2d 717 (2d Cir. 1967); Pearson v. Northeast Airlines,
Inc., 309 F.2d 553 (2d Cir. 1962); Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d
526, 211 N.Y.S.2d 133 (1961); Griffith v. United Air Lines, Inc., 416 Pa. 1, 203 A.2d 796 (1964).
See also Aircraft Hearings, supra note 52, at 73 (statement of Walter Beckham), 93 (statement of
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nonexistent. Realistically, for any possible cause of action under the Warsaw
Convention there is a counterpart in our domestic law. 17' In fact, at the
Senate hearings on the United States adherence to the Hague Protocol
plaintiffs' attorneys argued that the United States should denounce the
Warsaw Convention because it did not confer any
rights on the plaintiff that
72
were not already available under state law.
As another policy consideration the majority reasoned that the Multidistrict Litigation Act 73 "makes federal jurisdiction peculiarly appropriate in
large air crash cases.' 74 Although multidistrict litigation solves many problems involving air crash litigation, the recognition of an independent cause of
action might actually be disruptive of uniformity in those proceedings. For
example, if an aircraft manufacturer 75 or another airline, not the passenger's
carrier,1 76 were joined as co-defendant with the Warsaw carrier, there would
be two separate causes of action for the wrongful death of the same passenger:
one created by the Convention against the Warsaw carrier and one founded
on the applicable state law against the co-defendant. In contrast, under the
pre-Benjamins law there would be a single state-created cause of action
against the joint tortfeasors, but the liability of the Warsaw carrier would be
both presumed and limited.
Another consideration is the proposed legislation that would abolish diversity jurisdiction over actions between citizens of different states.1 7 Ifsuch
legislation is passed, domestic plaintiffs could bring only two types of actions
Andreas Lowenfeld), 110 (statement of Donald Trautman), 245 (statement of Lee Kreindler);
Hague Hearings, supra note 2, at 64-65 (statement of Lee Kreindler); Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn,
supra note 24, at 526-32.
171. See 572 F.2d at 923 (Van Graafeiland, J., dissenting).
172. "I think you will find that neither the War.aw Convention nor the Hague Protocol
confers any benefits whatsoever on anybody except the air carriers. That is the sole purpose of
these two conventions to limit the liability of carriers. It does not confer any benefits on the
passengers." Hague Hearings, supra note 2 at 58 (statement of Stuart Speiser); accord, id. at 64
(statement of Lee Kreindler). See also 111 Cong. Rec. 20378 (1965) (discussion of the Hague
Protocol on the floor of the House).
173. 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1976).
174. 572 F.2d at 919.
175. Cases in which the manufacturer is joined as a defendant are common. The manufacturer was joined in Benjamins. See note 9 supra. Another example is the litigation arising from
the crash of a Turkish Airlines DC-10 near Orly airport in Paris on March 3, 1974. Over 200
lawsuits were brought for the wrongful deaths of 337 passengers and crew members, The
defendants were Turkish Airlines, the international carrier, McDonnell Douglas, General Dynamics, and the United States. The latter three were alleged to be responsible for design defects of the
aircraft. For a discussion of the procedural and substantive complexity of that litigation, see In
re Paris Air Crash of March 3, 1974, 399 F. Supp. 732, 741-42 (C.D. Cal. 1975).
176. Such a situation arose from an accident on Match 27, 1977 when a KLM 747 and a Pan
American 747 collided on the runway at Tenerife, Canary Islands. Several cases were brought by
or on behalf of Pan American passengers against Pan American, as the international carrier, and
KLM and Boeing. In re Air Crash Disaster at Tenerife, Canary Islands on March 27, 1977, No.
306 (J.P.M.D.L. Aug. 19, 1977) (order of consolidation). The Convention would not apply
between these passengers and KLM since there was no contract of carriage between them,
177. See S. 2389, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978); H.R. 9622, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978); S.
2094, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); H.R. 9123, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
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in federal courts. The first type would be those against a domestic airline if
the plaintiff had a contract for "international transportation."1 7 8 The second
type would be those against an alien airline since the proposed legislation
would retain diversity jurisdiction over actions involving a domestic citizen
and an alien. 179 Ironically, however, the federal courts would have jurisdiction over actions by alien plaintiffs against domestic airlines (diversity)18 0 and,
under Benjamins, alien airlines (federal question).
Moreover, if Benjamins is upheld 8 1 a considerably greater number of
cases will come within the federal question jurisdiction of the federal courts
than those in which 'plaintiffs and defendants are all aliens," the only increase
envisioned by the Benjarnins majority. 18 2 In addition to cases similar to
Benjarnins in which aliens sue foreign airlines in the United States, Benjamins will admit all cases involving international transportation in which the
plaintiff and an American carrier reside in the same state. Finally, the Second
Circuit's decision will permit carriers sued in their own state court to remove
cases involving the Warsaw Convention to the federal court.' 8 3 In addition, if
Congress abolishes diversity jurisdiction 8 4 all of the Warsaw Convention
cases which satisfied the diversity requirements, and which would then be
excluded from the federal courts, would nevertheless be within the federal
question jurisdiction recognized by Benjamins.

178. See note 6 supra and accompanying text. Since international transportation under the
Convention includes all flights performed under an international contract of carriage, a domestic
sector in the itinerary of that contract is deemed international transportation under the Convention.
179. See, e.g., S. 2389, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. § 1 (1978).
180. This is a problem presented by the facts arising from an Eastern Airlines accident that
occurred at John F. Kennedy International Airport in New York on June 24, 1975. John F.
Kennedy International Airport Air Disaster Litigation, No. 227 (J.P.M.D.L. Feb. 9, 1976) (order
of consolidation). The aircraft was on a domestic flight from New Orleans and there were several
Norwegians on board. The abolition of diversity jurisdiction would bar all Americans with
domestic contracts of carriage from access to the federal courts. The Norwegians, however,
would be able to sue Eastern Airlines in the federal court.
181. It is not clear whether the other circuits will follow Benjamins as readily as they
followed Noel. In Dunn v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., No. 77-1649 (9th Cir. Sept. 21, 1978), the
Ninth Circuit was faced with the question of whether it was necessary for a plaintiff to plead the
Montreal Agreement, see note 24 supra, in order that it apply. It reviewed the pre-Benjamins
rule that the Convention provided only a presumption of liability to be applied to existing
substantive law and then observed that Benjamins, in recognizing a Convention-created cause of
action, may also require that the treaty be pleaded. The court decided, however, that under Fed.
R. Civ. P. 15(b) plaintiff could correct his pleadings at any time, including at the appellate level.
No. 77-1649, slip op. at 3139. The court did not have to decide at that time whether it should
follow Benjamins.
182. 572 F.2d at 919.
183. Removal of such cases under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (1976) would only be permissible if
jurisdiction could be based on a federal question.
184. See note 177 supra and accompanying text. Cf. State of the Judiciary and Access to
Justice: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties and the Administration of
Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 6-10, 272-92 (compilation of
speeches by Chief Justice Burger addressing the scope of federal jurisdiction).

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
The combination of Benjamins with the proposed elimination of the
minimum amount in controversy requirement for federal question jurisdiction 8 5 would open the federal courts to the thousands of minor injury and
baggage claims that are usually litigated in small claims courts. Thus,
although Congress is considering a substantial contraction of federal jurisdiction, the Benjamins majority has chosen to expand it in a case that ironically
involves no United States citizen or event. More importantly, Congress has
declined on several occasions to create a cause of action for Warsaw Convention cases,' 86 and the courts should not be permitted to create a cause of
action anyway. As Judge Van Graafeiland noted in his dissent, the Benjamins
majority drew "within the ever widening ambit of federal jurisdiction an
entirely new class of cases which Congress probably never intended should be
there." 187
CONCLUSION

The Noel rule, simple in reasoning and application, led a peaceful existence
for twenty-one years. Nevertheless in Benjamins the Second Circuit, with an
erroneous view of the Warsaw Convention, overruled Noel and held that the
Convention creates a cause of action for wrongful death. In providing
Abraham Benjamins with the opportunity to litigate his claim in a federal
court, the Second Circuit has created a morass of unnecessary and unwanted
problems.
Glenn Pogust
185. See S. 2389, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978); H.R. 9622, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978); S.
2094, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); H.R. 9123, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
186. See notes 49-56 supra and accompanying text.

187. 572 F.2d at 920 (Van Graafeiland, J., dissenting). In another context the Supreme Court
has stated: "It may be ... that aviation tort cases should be governed by uniform substantive and
procedural laws, and that such actions should be heard in the federal courts so as to avoid
divergent results and duplicitous litigation in multi-party cases. . . .If federal uniformity Is the
desired goal with respect to claims arising from aviation accidents, Congress is free under the
Commerce Clause to enact legislation applicable to all such accidents, whether occurring oi land
or water, and adapted to the specific characteristics of air commerce." Executive Jet Aviation,
Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249, 273-74 (1972).

